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ABSTRACT
Based on comprehensive research among boat operators and navy
personnel working on the Congo River (DRC), this article explores
how assessments of ‘taxation’ are shaped by the interplay of
legitimation and ‘officialisation’. As such, it draws upon and
contributes to scholarly debates on taxpayers’ attitudes towards
taxation. While boat operators resent having to pay a plethora of
authorities, including the navy, along the Congo River, the article
demonstrates how they locate these ‘taxes’ on a spectrum from
more to less legitimate. These assessments are shaped by various
factors: authorities’ legitimacy as ‘measured’ by their official
mandate and importance; public and non-official service
provision; and the deployment of symbols of ‘stateness’. In
interaction, these factors legitimise and ‘officialise’ ‘taxes’ by the
navy that are prohibited in legislation. These findings caution
against the a priori use of the labels ‘official’ and ‘non-official’,
emphasising the need to better grasp these notions’ emic
understandings.
« Naviguer entre les taxes » sur le fleuve Congo :
l’interface de la légitimation et de « l’officialisation »
RÉSUMÉ
A partir d’une enquête de terrain auprès des armateurs et du
personnel de marine travaillant sur le fleuve Congo (RDC), cet
article montre comment les appréciations de « taxation » sont
façonnées par l’interaction entre légitimation et « officialisation ».
Ce faisant, cette contribution s’inscrit dans la littérature sur le
comportement et les attitudes des contribuables face à la
taxation. Bien que les armateurs soient souvent réticents à
s’acquitter de taxes auprès de multiples pôles d’autorités, y
compris les forces navales, ces prélèvements revêtent un caractère
plus ou moins légitime à leurs yeux. De multiples facteurs
dessinent les contours de ces appréciations : la légitimité des
autorités taxatrices – mesurée en vertu de leur mandat officiel et
de leur importance, la capacité de ces dernières à assurer des
services publics et non officiels, ainsi que leur aptitude à afficher
des symboles étatiques. En interagissant, ces facteurs rendent
légitimes et « officielles » des « taxes » imposées par la marine qui
KEYWORDS
Taxation; informality; civil–
military relations; African
state; Democratic Republic of
the Congo
MOTS-CLÉS
Régime fiscal ; informalité ;
relations civilo-militaires ;
État africain ; République
démocratique du Congo
© 2018 ROAPE Publications Ltd
CONTACT Maria Eriksson Baaz maria.eriksson_baaz@statsvet.uu.se
REVIEW OF AFRICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY, 2018
https://doi.org/10.1080/03056244.2018.1451317
sont prohibées par la loi. Cette contribution remet ainsi en question
l’emploi a priori des labels « officiel » et « non officiel », tout en
soulignant la nécessité d’appréhender ces notions d’un point de
vue émique.
Introduction
The marines are the boss of the river (kolo mai) and the ones who help us when we get in
trouble in the waters. We don’t complain about paying them. We think they are very useful.
This assessment comes from a boat operator on the Congo River who transports agricul-
tural produce from the inland of the former Bandundu province to Kinshasa, the capital
city of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. On his way to Kinshasa, he encounters no
fewer than 20 government authorities at eight different posts. On average, total payments
to these authorities amount to almost 14% of the overall costs of a single journey (Olsson,
Eriksson Baaz, and Martinsson 2016). Boat operators therefore lament how these ‘taxes’
kill their business. Yet the citation above conveys a rather positive assessment of one of
the ‘taxing’ authorities; the marines, describing payments to them as somewhat legitimate.
At first glance, this assessment appears rather strange. It articulates a positive image of
the marines, despite the fact that the state security forces in the Congo generally have a bad
reputation (Eriksson Baaz and Verweijen 2013). The assessment is also surprising in light
of the general complaints among boat operators about the high fiscal burden they face.
What’s more, this boat operator expresses willingness to pay a ‘tax’ that had recently
been prohibited by an interministerial decree aimed at stopping harassment on the
river. How then, can we understand his – and most other boat operators’ that we inter-
viewed – relatively positive evaluation of payments to the marines? When and why are
certain payments to authorities in the Congo, herein labelled ‘taxes’, seen as more or as
less legitimate? This article explores these questions, based on comprehensive research
among boat operators and navy personnel working on the Congo River. It thus aims to
shed light on the processes and logics shaping views of ‘taxation’ in the Congo, with a
specific focus on the role of ‘officiality’, seen herein to relate to both rules and symbols.
‘Taxation’ on the Congo River offers a particularly interesting case to explore the role of
‘officiality’ for several reasons. First, we found that the interministerial decree – adopted in
2014 – that bans the majority of ‘taxes’ on the river was widely known among boat oper-
ators. Therefore, the official rules governing ‘taxation’ seem relatively unambiguous, in
particular when compared with other forms of taxation in the Congo (see Titeca and
de Herdt 2011). Second, all authorities involved in ‘taxation’ are state agents, hence
they can all deploy symbolic state power. Nevertheless, it emerged that some ‘taxes’ are
still seen as more official than others, which allowed us to study the relative importance
of the other factors shaping ‘officialisation’. Finally, looking at ‘taxation’ on the Congo
River is pertinent owing to the involvement of both military and civilian state agents. Con-
sequently, we could explore to what extent the possibility of exercising armed force makes
a difference in terms of assessments of ‘taxation’.
As we will demonstrate, boat operators locate payments to authorities on a spectrum
ranging from more to less legitimate, in ways that largely reflect the main factors empha-
sised in previous research on taxpayers’ attitudes towards taxation: deterrence, reciprocity,
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social influences and (authorities’) legitimacy (Fjeldstad, Schulz-Herzenberg, and Hoem
Sjursen 2012). Yet our data show that such factors always work in interaction, rather
than in a stand-alone manner. For instance, both ‘deterrence’ and ‘reciprocity’ need to
be unpacked, by taking the complex workings of ‘social influences’ into account, in par-
ticular non-official logics such as patronage. Perceptions of the legitimacy of authorities
and the ‘taxes’ they impose similarly draw upon notions of ‘non-officiality’, notably auth-
orities’ ability to provide non-official services such as ‘tax’ reduction. This ability also func-
tions as a form of ‘reciprocity’ which is hence not limited to public service provision. In
sum, the article demonstrates how any effort to understand logics around ‘taxation’ –
including why certain ‘taxes’ persist in spite of being legally banned – must probe
deeply into emic understandings of ‘officiality’ and ‘non-officiality’.
The rest of the article proceeds as follows. First, we briefly discuss literature on African
taxpayers’ views of taxation and the role of ‘formality’ and ‘informality’ in taxation prac-
tices. Subsequently, we account for the methodology used and the data upon which the
article is based. The next section provides an insight into the study’s socio-economic
context, describing the system of river ‘taxation’ and the naval forces. This paves the
way for an in-depth discussion of the processes and logics shaping views of ‘taxation’.
We conclude by reviewing the ways in which these processes and logics interact in
shaping assessments of ‘taxation’, and the implications of our findings for understandings
of ‘the official’ and ‘the non-official’.
Taxation, (de)legitimation and (in)formalisation
In recent years, scholarly attention on taxation in Africa has intensified. This study draws
on two strands of this emerging literature: first, debates on taxpayers’ views, attitudes and
behaviour towards taxation; and second, discussions of ‘formality’ and ‘informality’ within
taxation. In respect of the first, we make use of the study of Fjeldstad, Schulz-Herzenberg,
and Hoem Sjursen (2012), which identifies a number of factors that shape African tax-
payers’ perceptions and behaviour towards taxation. These encompass: (1) economic
deterrence; or perceptions of how difficult it is to evade taxation; (2) fiscal exchange or
reciprocity, relating to perceived returns in terms of the provision of public goods and ser-
vices; (3) ‘social influences’, including group norms and behaviour towards taxation; and
(4) the legitimacy of political institutions, which is in part shaped by perceptions of the
fairness of the political system.
A second debate that we draw upon relates to what Prud’Homme (1992, 2) terms
‘informal taxation’. Reflecting earlier discussions on informality in the economy, scholars
of taxation grapple with conceptualising the ‘informal’ and ‘non-state’ spheres and the
relations of these spheres to the ‘formal’ and ‘state’ domains. While some see informal
revenue extraction by state agents primarily in terms of ‘predation’, negatively impacting
state legitimacy and the economy (on Congo, e.g. Rackley 2006), others highlight its con-
stitutive role in service provision and the reproduction of ‘the state’ (on Congo, e.g. Trefon
2009). Similar to Roitman (2004), we prefer the terms ‘official’ and ‘non-official’ to
‘formal’ and ‘informal’, not only as the term ‘informal’ has become an empty signifier
(Ibid.), but also as ‘officiality’ better fits the modes of reasoning and narratives encoun-
tered in the research context.
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Since the 2000s, the discussion on non-official revenue generation by state agents in
Africa – whether labelled ‘taxation’ or ‘corruption’ – has become linked to debates on gov-
ernance and statehood in Africa more generally (e.g. Lund 2006; Hagmann and Péclard
2010; Titeca and de Herdt 2011). These debates have given rise to a consensus that gov-
ernance and (public) authority are produced through the interplay of both official and
non-official actors, logics and practices. Highlighting the porousness of state/society
and public/private boundaries, Lund (2006) coins the term ‘twilight institutions’ to
describe how ‘rules, controls and in particular their legitimisation, resist unequivocal situ-
ation in either “state” or “society”’ (Ibid., 689). Inspired by Hansen and Stepputat’s (2001)
notion of ‘languages of stateness’, he also emphasises the importance of signs and symbols
of stateness within the exercise of public authority, including bureaucratic idioms and
administrative regalia such as contracts and stamps. The deployment of such symbols
affects the legitimation of authority, which, as Moore (1988) reminds us, is an ongoing
and dynamic process that is ill-captured by the static label ‘legitimacy’. The legitimation
of authority, in turn, shapes and is shaped by practices of taxation. While the extractive
practices of authorities seen as legitimate will sooner appear licit, taxation seen as
unjust will undermine authorities’ legitimacy (Roitman 2004; Juul 2006; Sikor and Lund
2009). What role ‘officiality’ plays within these processes of legitimation, however,
remains only partly understood.
As Prud’Homme (1992) discovered in his research on Zaire (as the Congo was formerly
called), forms of non-official ‘taxation’ are not necessarily considered illegitimate. Com-
menting on ‘requisitions’ (goods and services provided to state agents), he observed
that ‘a number of businesspeople seem to consider these … as quite normal and part
of good neighborly relationships’. This indicates ‘that they benefit from good relationships
with local authorities, perhaps in the form of favourable tax treatment’ (Ibid., 6). Similarly,
Prichard and van den Boogaard (2017, 181) observe that at markets in Northern Ghana,
taxpayers appear willing to pay non-official ‘taxes’ to ‘avoid disrupting the social order, to
“keep the peace” within the market, to avoid public embarrassment, or to maintain good
relations with tax collectors’. Prud’Homme (1992) also emphasises how, in the face of low
wages and the limited resources allocated for operational expenditure, non-official ‘tax’
payments allow state agents to exercise their official function and engage in public
service delivery. As we demonstrate below, this contribution to authorities’ daily work
is clearly reflected in boat operators’ justifications of payments made to the navy. These
justifications therefore seem to reflect what Olivier de Sardan (2015, 29) has coined
‘palliative practical norms’, that is, norms that ‘deviate from the letter of explicit norms,
but … have the objective to rescue the “spirit” of public service delivery’.
The above-mentioned studies all point to the complex interplay between ‘the official’
and ‘the non-official’ within taxation and its legitimation. As Prichard and van den Boo-
gaard (2017, 181) emphasise, understandings of both legality and legitimacy are ‘subjective
and context-specific’. Yet few studies systematically explore when and why taxation prac-
tices are perceived and experienced as ‘official’ and ‘non-official’, by taxpayers and tax
collectors alike. They rather use these labels as a priori categorisations. Yet this may
cloud our understanding of the processes by which practices, including ‘taxation’, come
to be construed as ‘official’ or ‘non-official’.
In Congo-specific studies, however, a growing body of work examines certain dimen-
sions of the construction of ‘officiality’. For instance, Titeca and de Herdt (2011) point out
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that within the Congo, the official rules are often not known or divergently interpreted,
rendering the boundaries of ‘the official’ very malleable (see also Titeca and Kimanuka
2012). Studying interactions between Congolese civil servants and economic operators,
Rubbers (2007) observes that the ways in which the boundaries between ‘the official’
and ‘non-official’ are drawn reflect the outcome of complex negotiations involving
appeals to legislation and official symbols. These observations point to the need to
approach ‘officialisation’ and ‘de-officialisation’ as processes, rather than as fixed qualities.
For the same reason, we refrain from labelling what we call ‘taxation’ here (between quo-
tation marks to indicate the contested nature of this labelling) as either ‘official’ or ‘non-
official’.
Some notes on methods
The material used in this article was collected between 2013 and 2015 by the authors and
two research assistants and consists of two different data sources.1 The first comprises in-
depth, semi-structured interviews with boat operators in the Kinshasa, Kinkole and
Maluku areas. These interviews focused on the structure of their business activities and
their perceptions of the various authorities enacting ‘taxation’. Owing to the importance
of attending to the perspectives of the authorities collecting the ‘taxes’ (given that this
shapes the ways they perform ‘taxation’, which may in turn influence how it is experienced
by taxpayers), we also conducted interviews with marines. The choice fell on the marines
since they constitute one of the main ‘tax’ collectors, and since their ‘taxation’ was totally
banned by the 2014 decree (in contrast to some other authorities – see below). The inter-
views with the marines focused on professional identities, perceptions of roles and man-
dates, as well as the organisation of ‘tax’ collection.
The second source of data consists of a survey held between February and June 2015
among in total 137 boat operators. The survey was taken in Lingala and developed in con-
sultation with the Union congolaise des armateurs des baleinières (UCAB), the Congolese
Union for Operators of Whaleboats. The latter is the most common type of boat used on
the Congo River made of wood. The survey was held among boat operators who had just
arrived in Kinshasa (mostly in the Kinkole area) from journeys on either the Lukenie or
the Kasai rivers, which are tributaries to the Congo. Several measures were taken to ensure
the quality of the collected data, including the use of logbooks when filling in the survey
(see Olsson, Eriksson Baaz, and Martinsson 2016, for more details). Aside from questions
about their business and the contributions paid to each authority at each post, the survey
included questions about views of ‘taxation’ and the various authorities involved. In par-
ticular, boat operators were asked what authorities were useful and authorised to operate
and ‘tax’ and why. The article draws predominantly on this qualitative part of the survey,
which was quite rich, given that the survey interviews were voice-recorded whenever per-
mitted. Yet for a number of crucial insights, the article is primarily based on the in-depth
interviews, which helped uncover certain practices – particularly the use of the marines to
reduce ‘taxation’ – that were rarely mentioned during the survey interviews.
Since boat operating is a male-dominated occupation, no women were encountered.
The average operator was about 47 years old and had approximately nine years of experi-
ence (see Ibid.). No significant variations in views were found among those with different
age or experience, which warrants the treatment of ‘boat operators’ as a relatively
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homogeneous group herein. In the following, we further describe the system of river ‘taxa-
tion’ as relayed by the boat operators, and then zoom in on the marines.
‘Taxation’ and naval forces on the river
The Congo River is a crucial lifeline to Kinshasa, providing much-needed produce from
the hinterlands to its approximately 12 million inhabitants (Iazzolino 2016). While the
road network connecting Kinshasa to the former Bandundu province (since 2015 split
into the provinces of Mai-Ndombe, Kwilu and Kwango) has been somewhat rehabilitated
in recent years, the bulk of agricultural goods are still transported via the waterways. One
boat can take between 500 and 1800 bags (of 50–70 kilograms each), depending on size.
Many operators, however, overload their boats, which frequently leads to shipping disas-
ters. The boat operators interviewed mainly transport maize and dried and non-dried
manioc ( fufu and kimpuka), but also other goods such as peanuts, charcoal, dried fish
and livestock. They also carry passengers, the majority of whom are small-scale traders
bringing their merchandise to Kinshasa. Most operators transport merchandise both of
passengers and their own, but always strive to increase the proportion of their own
goods to enhance their profits. The latter are on average US$3670 per journey (travelling
downstream to Kinshasa), although many also make a loss. Average profits are not very
high, especially in light of the turnover. The costs for buying agricultural produce alone
(excluding petrol and other expenses) – considered essential to make a profit on the
next trip downstream – can amount to between US$1500 and 3000.2 Additionally, the
amount of journeys made per year is limited, ranging between three and five, although
some operators go even less frequently.
River ‘taxation’: a cacophony of authorities
Most of the posts – and concomitant ‘taxing’ authorities – along the Congo River and its
tributaries emerged as a result of the area’s heavy militarisation during the Second Congo
War (1998–2003) (Rackley 2006). For instance, during the time of Mobutu, there was only
one administrative post between Oshwe and Kinshasa on the Lukenie line (in Kwamouth),
while at present there are seven (interviews, November 2014). In the light of this multipli-
cation of ‘taxing’ authorities, which had also occurred in other parts of the country, various
associations of boat operators started a lobby to identify all ‘taxes’ levied on the waterways.
This demand was eventually honoured, leading to an investigation conducted by govern-
ment representatives and the UCAB. This investigation found that nationwide, no fewer
than 17 authorities (linked to eight different ministries)3 were levying in total 55 different
types of contributions along the river (Arrête interministériel 2014). In addition to ‘taxes’
collected at fixed posts, the state security forces, in particular the marines and the Police
fluviale (river police), asked for contributions at so-called postes flottantes (floating
posts). The amounts of these different ‘taxes’, which each had their own specific name,
such as taxe visa arrivé (arrival visa tax) or taxe visa départ (departure visa tax), were
reported to be more or less fixed. This fixity indicates that they were not arbitrarily
imposed, but highly institutionalised.
An interministerial decree adopted on 19 June 2014 declared about two-thirds (38 out
of 55) of the ‘taxes’ illegal. However, some authorities remained with a right to impose a
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few contributions, such as the Commissariat fluvial (Riverine Commission, authorised to
levy two out of twelve of the identified ‘taxes’) and the Direction-générale de migration
(Directorate-General of Migration) (authorised to levy one out of nine). Others, by con-
trast, were banned from ‘taxing’ altogether, such as the Direction-générale des douanes et
accises (Directorate-General of Customs and Duties), the Fond de promotion du tourisme
(Fund for Tourism Promotion) and the Fond de promotion culturelle (Cultural Promotion
Fund). A complete ban was also pronounced for the armed forces and other state security
forces, such as the national intelligence agency and the river police. The ‘tax’ imposed by
the provincial government of Bandundu on agricultural produce, the so-called recouvre-
ment, was also forbidden. This ‘tax’ is paid at Mushie post at the rate of 1500 Congolese
francs (FC) or US$1.61 per bag, regardless of the product.
The survey among boat operators, which was conducted after the adoption of the 2014
decree, indicates that, except for the initial months, the reform did not bring substantial
changes. In Mushie, the provincial government still ‘taxes’ agricultural goods, which con-
stitutes by far the heaviest ‘tax’ burden for boat operators: 65% of total payments. The
second biggest ‘tax’ collector is the Commissariat fluvial, receiving 7.5% of total payments
(on average US$23 per payment). The third biggest receiver is the marines, getting 6.4% of
total payments, or the value of US$11 per transaction (Olsson, Eriksson Baaz, and Mar-
tinsson 2016). This contribution is divided into five litres of petrol (an amount that is
always the same, highlighting the high level of institutionalisation of this type of ‘taxation’)
and the rest in cash. Since the main focus of this article is marine ‘taxation’, a brief back-
ground to the naval forces is warranted.
The Congolese navy: ‘we are no forces troubles’
The Congolese navy is part of the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo
(FARDC, Armed Forces of the DRC). Countrywide, it is divided into four groupements
navals (naval sectors), which are headed by the central marine command in Kinshasa.
For this research, marines were contacted in the First Naval Sector, which is constituted
of the rivers Congo, Ubangi, Kwilu, Kasai and their sub-rivers as well as Lake Ndombe.
In addition to smaller posts along the river, the naval forces have one big camp in
central Kinshasa (in Kingabwa, Limete), which is simply called Force Navale, and also
hosts some of the marines’ families.4 While most of the boat operators contacted
docked and offloaded goods in the harbour of Kinkole, some also went to Force Navale
camp, which sometimes doubles as a civilian harbour, thereby constituting a source of
income for the camp.
The naval forces share many of the basic features of the Congolese infantry, which
makes up the largest part of the FARDC. In October 2013, only 6434 of the total
144,681 troops then registered were marines (interview, army expert, November 2013).
Similar to other parts of the army (and indeed the administration in general), the navy
has minimal infrastructure, such as barracks and equipment. They have only a limited
number of low-quality speedboats, particularly upstream, where they mainly use the
same wooden boats as civilians. Moreover, they lack regular supplies of petrol, which
limits their mobility. Like other state services in the Congo, salaries are irregular and
low, ranging at present between US$100 and 170 a month, depending on rank. This
amount is far from sufficient for even a small family to live off.
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While scarce resources and low salaries foster engagement in revenue generation, naval
‘taxation’ should also be seen in the light of the salience of patronage networks and the so-
called ‘rapportage’ system (Verweijen 2013). Like in other state security services (Eriksson
Baaz and Olsson 2011; Schouten, Murairi, and Batundi 2017), lower-level personnel in the
naval forces are under pressure from those in the higher echelons to generate resources,
commonly by extracting these from civilians. A large part of this money does not go to
the soldiers themselves but is channelled higher up the command chain. Given that
units and commanders who underperform in terms of harvesting resources are often
deployed to zones with lesser revenue-generating opportunities and are denied promotion,
the stakes of rapportage are high.
As described below, marines interpret rapportage largely in terms of enabling their pro-
fessional functioning, as viewed through the lens of their professional identity. Similar to
many other naval forces globally, the Congolese marines – who take strong pride in being
in the navy – position themselves in relation to the infantry. They articulate a self-image of
being well trained, well educated and well disciplined, in particular when compared with
the infantry, which they often label forces troubles (forces of trouble) (interviews, 2015).
According to the marines contacted, one reason for their perceived superiority is that
in contrast to the infantry, only a few ex-rebel forces with limited military training were
integrated into the naval forces after the end of the Second Congo War, especially so in
the western parts of the country. Consequently, the navy there is to a large extent com-
posed of soldiers who have always served in the government forces and who are relatively
well educated, in terms of both general and military education. Furthermore, most navy
personnel pertain to a particular generation that served in the army under the Mobutu
presidency and are all quite old. These features might influence the ways these forces
enact ‘taxation’ and are perceived by the population. Compared with other groups in
the military, higher educated and older military personnel tend to more strongly invoke
professional norms and identities, thereby instilling confidence that they are knowledge-
able ‘security professionals’ (Verweijen 2015).
Making sense of boat operators’ ‘taxation’ experiences
As mentioned above, while the boat operators interviewed expressed resentment towards
the system of ‘taxation’ as a whole, within their day-to-day interactions they clearly
located ‘taxation’ on a spectrum of legitimacy. Only a few boat operators displayed
more extreme attitudes, arguing that either all or none of the ‘taxing’ authorities were
useful and mandated to be present. The two (out of 137) who argued that all are
useful, mentioned that ‘the state was not stupid’ (l’état eza zoba te) and therefore
must have its reasons to put the authorities there (interview, May 2015). The four
who argued that none are useful labelled their practices as pure harassment (tracas-
series). As one of them argued, ‘none of them are useful, they are just harassing us,
they are all just thieves’ (interview, May 2015). Yet the vast majority of boat operators
provided a more nuanced picture, arguing that some authorities were indeed useful and
had the right to ‘tax’, but others not. In the following, we further analyse the factors
shaping these assessments. First, we address understandings of authorities’ legitimacy,
as ‘measured’ by their official mandate and their importance, including their (perceived)
capacity for deterrence. Second, we explore the dimension of public service provision
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and the deployment of symbols of stateness (relating to the fiscal exchange principle and
social influences, respectively). Third, we attend to non-official service provision, which
equally relates to fiscal exchange and social influences.
Authorities’ legitimacy ‘measured’ by official mandates and importance
With a few exceptions, the boat operators that were interviewed identified the Commis-
sariat fluvial and the marines as the most useful authorities and as being legitimately
present on the river, in both cases largely owing to their official mandate. Authorities per-
ceived as lacking an official mandate to be present were generally deemed illegitimate.
Consequently, their engagement in ‘taxation’ was seen as illegitimate too. This category
included certain branches of the security services (such as the civilian and military intelli-
gence services) and – above all – the provincial authorities levying the recouvrement. Inter-
estingly, to emphasise the illegal status of this ‘tax’, boat operators mentioned the 2014
decree particularly often, which indicates that this piece of legislation was widely
known. Notions of illegality, however, were not invoked in relation to the contributions
demanded by the naval forces, which the decree equally prohibits, pointing to the varie-
gated ways in which ‘the official’ and ‘the non-official’ are interpreted and deployed.
Accounts of the official mandate of the Commissariat fluvial, seen as having the most
legitimate presence, generally highlighted that they are in charge of regulating river traffic
and issuing permits. Thus, these narratives often featured wordings that the Commissariat
is the ‘boss’ or ‘master’ of the river (mokonzi ya mai/kolo mai), being the authority of the
river traffic. As one boat operator put it, ‘the Commissariat fluvial, they are dealing with
river traffic (ye nde atali ebale), the rest of them – except for the marines – what are they
really doing there?’ (interview, May 2015). Another commented, ‘the Commissariat
fluvial are the guardians of the river traffic, they are like fathers, they can help you, but
also shut you down (bakoki kobikisa pe koboma yo)’ (interview, May 2015). Here, this
operator (as others) refers to the role and authority of the Commissariat to issue and
cancel navigation permits, which were clearly framed as issued by ‘the state’.
The invocation of the capacity to ‘shut one down’ draws attention to the ‘deterrence’ prin-
ciple mentioned earlier, which stipulates that the more difficult a particular tax is seen to
avoid, the more willing people are to pay (Fjeldstad, Schulz-Herzenberg, and Hoem
Sjursen 2012). In the case of the Commissariat, such ‘deterrence’ is clearly related to it
being the boss/master of the river and the associated dimension of coercion. As boat oper-
ators’ narratives conveyed, however, the notion of boss/master bears stronger connotations
of mastery/competence than of brute force. One indication of this is the comparison to
‘fathers’ (see above), who – reflecting logics of patronage/protection – are associated with
both sternness and benevolence. Hence, the notion of coercion inherent to the deterrence
principle should be qualified, as it can assume different forms and degrees.
As exemplified by the words of the boat operator opening this article, the marines were
also referred to as the ‘boss’ or ‘master’ of the river. However, their official mandate was
mostly described in terms of riverine rescue. The marines themselves similarly evoked
their rescue mandate as legitimating their presence. In particular, they pointed to the
specific section in the 2011 Defence Law that states that one of the functions of the
naval forces is precisely to ‘assist ships, boats and aircraft in distress in territorial
waters’ (Loi organique 2011).5 They linked these tasks to the army’s (peace-time)
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mandate – as enshrined in the constitution – to ‘protect the people (civilians) and their
belongings’ (Ibid.). Yet the marines also read their activities on the river in the light of
their duty to maintain order and bring security more generally. This duty is commonly
broadly interpreted, and therefore includes tasks that are not specified in the marines’ offi-
cial mandate, but that are considered to conform to its spirit, like upholding the law and
ensuring public safety. One example is policing boat operators who seek to dodge the posts
on the river to save money and time. As one marine put it, ‘when the boat operators some-
times try to skip a poste without signing the papers [at the authorities], we marines have to
go out on the water to stop them and verify the documents’ (interview, October 2014). As
he and others explained, they are often the only authority that have boats/engines available
and thus can stop boats trying to bypass the posts.
The marines’ occasional wide interpretation of their mandate partly explains why the
boat operators did not always portray them in a positive manner. Some argued that the
marines at times exaggerate with ‘taxation’ (often seasonally, around Christmas and the
start of the school year), and deliberately seek problems. As one operator explained, ‘they
say: “why do you have passengers sitting on the roof!? Overload! (surcharge)”. So they
also sometimes look for infractions in order to be able to augment the fees’ (interview,
March 2015). Yet the articulation of complaints of ‘exaggeration’ did not diminish the over-
arching sentiment of the relative legitimacy of the marines’ presence – and relatedly of their
‘taxation’–which was clearly linked to their official mandate. Another reason for this relative
sense of legitimacy was the marines’ perceived importance. Similar to the Commissariat
fluvial, this importance was partly read in relation to the naval forces’ potential to create dif-
ficulties, although it was also linked to its provision of useful services (see further below). The
relatively positive views of naval ‘taxation’ thus shed a different light on the ‘deterrence prin-
ciple’: the more important the authority in terms of their capability to hinder boat operators’
business, the more important it is to maintain good relations, hence to pay ‘taxes’.
Public service provision and symbols of stateness
As indicated above, fiscal exchange was also found to play a prominent role in shaping
views of river ‘taxation’. Yet we observed that the experience of exchange is not a given
but stems from complex interactions between service provision and other factors. The
latter include the presence of symbols of stateness – like documents – which we consider
a form of ‘social influences’ herein.
The fiscal exchange principle appeared most strongly at work in the total delegitimation
of the recouvrement (the provincial ‘tax’). While the boat operators stated that the ‘tax’ was
too hefty and illegal, they also lamented that they could not see any benefits from it. As one
operator concluded:
The money goes straight into the governor’s pockets. So we are paying a lot of taxes for
nothing. We see no changes, no new services, no development. If the taxes we pay are for
real (eza réelles) that is no problem. But what we see here that is something different (eza
eloko mususu). (Interview, March 2015)
Furthermore, the recouvrement was described as totally impossible to avoid given that the
provincial ‘tax’ ofﬁcials in Mushie have their own motorised boats, hence they can pursue
those trying to dodge payment.
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In contrast to the provincial authorities, both the marines and the Commissariat fluvial
were portrayed as service-providing authorities, implying ‘you get something for the
money you pay’, including documents. For the Commissariat fluvial, service provision
was seen to include the issuing and controlling of permits. As one operator put it, ‘they
are needed because it is they who control all the baleinières and also for the money we
give to them we get a document’ (interview, March 2015). The presence of a receipt
was linked to the belief that the money paid goes to the state treasury. As one operator
said, ‘the money we pay goes into the state treasury (caisse ya l’état), because they give
us a proof of payment (preuve de paiement)’ (interview, March 2015). Conversely, the
lack of receipts was often referred to as indicating that the money did not go to ‘the
state’, thereby delegitimising the presence and ‘taxation’ practices of the authorities in
question. These findings indicate that in particular when tangible and linked to the experi-
ence of service provision, symbolic connections to ‘the state’ have strong legitimising
effects.
The perception of effective service provision was even stronger in relation to the
marines. While their relative usefulness was sometimes ascribed to their maintaining
security more generally, it was mainly attributed to their official rescue mandate. This
mandate was described as crucial given the difficulty to navigate, and the high level of acci-
dents. Importantly, according to most boat operators, the marines do not ask for money
when they intervene in case of accidents, except for sometimes asking compensation for
the petrol consumed. Similar to the Commissariat fluvial, the presence of documents
also played an important role in accounts of the marines’ service provision. According
to the boat operators, cash payments to the marines (which come in addition to providing
petrol) serve to check and sign the bulletin de bureau mouvement (a document of the
navy’s ‘bureau of movement’). This document contains information about the boat, des-
tination, names of the captain and passengers etc., and is signed by the marines at every
post down the river. While many contended that they know that these payments are not
authorised, they were still described as somehow ‘normal’ and ‘official’, as evidenced by
the fact that at least some sort of document was checked and completed.
In addition to references to the provided services, the boat operators justified payments
to the naval forces by referring to the marines’ difficult conditions and poor salaries. In the
words of one operator: ‘there is no official fee, but there he is, the soldier with his difficul-
ties (pasi na ye), asking “look for some coffee money for me”, and you give him’ (interview,
March 2015). The contribution in petrol (most often at the stable rate of five litres) was
generally also referred to as ‘normal’, as it was contended that the marines – particularly
higher up along the river – do not have petrol and need it to do their work. This reasoning
reflects the notion of ‘palliative practical norms’ referred to above, as it alludes to (non-
official) payments needed for the navy to carry out its ‘official’ mandate and engage in
service delivery. As one operator put it:
They don’t have petrol, they only have the petrol they get from us armateurs [boat operators],
the small contributions, five litres here, five litres there – that is what makes them able to do
their work (po epermettre bango basala mosala). (Interview, March 2015)
Similar to the boat operators, the marines emphasised that they would not be able to fulﬁl
their ofﬁcial mandate, including rescuing civilian boats, without the contributions from
the boat operators, in particular the fuel. As one of them put it, ‘it is normal. In case
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they [boat operators] have accidents we are the ones saving them, so it [the fuel] is a con-
tribution to that work that we do’ (interview, November 2014).
While collecting reliable data on the distribution of the collected ‘taxes’ among the navy
was difficult, narratives from the marines point to a quite clear system and logic regulating
the division of the monetary contributions. As one marine explained:
We divide the money into three parts: first is the envelope to our superiors in Kinshasa
(enveloppe ya mikonzi na biso na Kinshasa), second is social security (caisse sociale) and
the third, that part we divide among the number of marines at the post. (Interview,
October 2014)
As explained, the enveloppe is sent to Kinshasa, where a part is used for the maintenance of
the main camp, which also hosts military families, while other parts go to the comman-
ders. Depending on the intensity of boat trafﬁc, the total amounts collected at each post
were reported to be between US$1600 and 2000 per month, of which around 30%
(US$500–600) goes to the headquarters in Kinshasa (the ‘envelope’). Except for a quite
limited amount (US$110–150) allegedly destined for social security (medical care or
deaths) at the post, the rest is reportedly divided between the marines (at the post),
amounting to between US$22 and 90 per marine per month. As one naval ofﬁcer
concluded, ‘in short, all get something (bref, batu nionso baliaka ndambu ndambu)’
(interview, October 2014).
Hence the system of rapportage appears highly institutionalised, contributing to the
marines’ experience of the collection and distribution of resources from boat operators
as an ‘official’ system that is regulated and sanctioned by their hierarchy. ‘Taxes’ are col-
lected following well-defined rules, and the revenues are at least in part used for allowing
the naval forces to fulfil their official mandate and provide social security to their
members. The marines are likely to convey the belief that it concerns an official system
in interactions with boat operators, thereby influencing the latter’s narratives and percep-
tions of ‘taxation’.
Non-official service provision
While most accounts of ‘fiscal exchange’ emphasise the provision of ‘public goods and ser-
vices’, our findings indicate that ‘non-public’ (and non-official) services also play a role.
Some boat operators recounted that the marines assist them with cutting the amounts
paid to other authorities along the river. Their willingness to pay ‘taxes’ to the marines
was therefore partly connected to the latter’s capability to help reduce other ‘taxes’. As
explained earlier, the marines are often the only authority with access to boats with
engines, enabling them to go out and stop boats that try to bypass a post. This unique pos-
ition allows them to make particular arrangements with boat operators which consist of
allowing the operator to pass a post and avoid payment to other authorities in exchange
for a fee. As one boat operator explained:
You have to arrange with them [the marines] beforehand, because if you don’t – if you pass
the post without arranging somehow – all the other agencies will get into the boats of the
marines – DGM [migration], Commissariat fluvial and others – because they have no
boats of their own so they will come to collect too with the marines. But if you have arranged
with the marines, they will just let you pass and if other authorities see, they tell them that
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they cannot go out because they have no fuel [laughing] … . So instead of paying 70,000 [FC,
approx. US$58] you can get away with 50,000 or 30,000 or something. (Interview, July 2013)
In many cases, such bypassing, which was generally described as something you can do
once or perhaps twice per trip, takes place at night when the boats usually do not travel
owing to difﬁculties in navigating. From the boat operators’ accounts, it emerged that
the money saved can be quite substantial. The fees, however, are negotiable, indicating
that these arrangements are less institutionalised than other forms of ‘taxation’, which
come at a quite stable rate. One boat operator described engaging in such negotiations
close to Maluku:
I had docked the baleinière just near Maluku and was walking on foot and met the marin
commander who asked me if all my papers were in order, I told him ‘no’, so he asked me
what I wanted to do. I said, ‘I want to pass at night to avoid the post’. So he asked ‘what
would you pay ( formalité) there during the day with the papers you have?’, I said ‘40,000’
[FC, approx. US$33]. So he said, ‘give me those 40,000 and I will let you pass and you will
save the time, because during the day, if you do not have papers, they will bother you a
lot (bakocompliquer yo makasi)’. But I said ‘I do not have 40,000’. He said, ‘ok then, then
give me this (pesa ngai boye)’. I said ‘17,000’, he said ‘no!’ We discussed and discussed –
in the end I gave him 15,000 and he said, ‘ok you can go, we will not see your boat’, so
we passed. (Interview, July 2013)
These arrangements (which can be proposed by either party) are clearly described as a
win–win solution. As one operator put it, ‘they [the marines] do it because they proﬁt
(po balia), but we also proﬁt, because the harassment from the other authorities is
killing us (ezoboma biso)’ (interview, July 2013). Since such practices are sensitive and dif-
ﬁcult to uncover, it is impossible to assess the extent to which they occur. Moreover, it
remains unclear whether these arrangements are generalised or only made by a particular
type of operators. While none of the boat operators confessing to making such arrange-
ments had any close (family) bonds with marines, some of them had at times docked
their baleinière at the Force Navale camp in Kinshasa. Furthermore, those who sometimes
chose this camp as discharging harbour often argued that they felt more protected and less
harassed there. In their accounts, docking there also provided them with some protection
by marines further upstream, limiting potential harassment. As they explained, while
docking at Force Navale does not imply that you do not have to pay ‘taxes’ upstream to
the marines, it does reduce the risk they will ask you for more. At the same time, it
increases the likelihood they will help when you get in trouble with other authorities.
For instance, one boat operator described how he had been arrested by another state
agent, and that the marines had helped him to get released, without paying them anything.
This example indicates how, similar to ﬁndings by Prud’Homme (1992) and Juul (2006),
assessments of the justiﬁcation of payments are not only made based on narrow criteria of
‘public service provision’. They also draw on wider notions of ‘maintaining good relations’
that often have a dimension of patronage/protection, including the protection of non-ofﬁ-
cial and at times illegal practices (such as ‘tax’ evasion) (cf. Verweijen 2013).
Conclusions
Drawing on interviews and surveys among boat operators and marines, this article has
shed light on the processes and logics shaping views of ‘taxation’ on the Congo River.
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We found that the four main factors commonly highlighted in studies on taxpayers’ views
and attitudes towards taxation, namely deterrence, reciprocity, social influences and (auth-
orities’) legitimacy (Fjeldstad, Schulz-Herzenberg, and Hoem Sjursen 2012), indeed all
play a role. Yet the data reveal that these factors generate effects mostly in interaction,
rather than in a stand-alone manner. In particular, the notions of both ‘deterrence’ and
‘reciprocity’ need refinement by taking social influences into account, notably the
complex workings of ‘non-official’ logics such as patronage/protection.
The deterrence principle appeared to be at work in relation to both the marines and the
Commissariat fluvial, in the sense that boat operators were willing to pay ‘taxes’ to these
authorities to avoid getting into trouble. However, such willingness could not be detected
in the case of the provincial ‘tax’, which figured as both the most difficult to avoid and the
most illegitimate. We ascribe these assessments not only to the high level of this particular
‘tax’, but also to the perceived lack of the provincial authority’s ‘social content’, including
the absence of (the potential for) both ‘official’ and ‘non-official’ service provision. This
authority is only encountered at one post and is little susceptible to negotiations, hence
maintaining good relations will not benefit boat operators in other parts of their
journey or in other dimensions of their business. In a similar vein, the importance of
‘deterrence’ not only lies in avoiding the coercive capabilities of the authority in question
being used against you, but also in ensuring that these capabilities are potentially deployed
in your favour, including via the protection of less ‘official’ practices. After all, those
capable of inflicting most harm also tend to be those capable of offering the best protec-
tion, including in non-official domains (Chabal and Daloz 1999). In sum, in our study,
‘deterrence’ did not work as a stand-alone factor but was assessed in conjunction with a
range of other factors, including more and less official service provision.
Furthermore and importantly, the notion of deterrence was clearly not only seen in terms
of physical force, but was also related to administrative coercion (e.g. withholding permits)
and intransigence. Hence, although a military actor, the navy was not experienced as the
most ‘deterrent’, which in turn puts the relative importance of arms-bearing into perspec-
tive. Additionally, where the navy engaged in practices forbidden by the law and seen as
less licit – such as facilitating ‘tax’ evasion – this also occurred on the explicit demand of
boat operators themselves, and not through one-sided imposition by force.
The dimension of non-official service provision draws attention to the need to nuance
the fiscal exchange or reciprocity principle. In spite of a substantial body of research high-
lighting that taxpayers also pay contributions in relation to expectations of (potential) reci-
procity in non-official ways (Prud’Homme 1992; Juul 2006; Prichard and van den
Boogaard 2017), fiscal exchange continues to be conceptualised in terms of ‘public
service provision’. In the case analysed here, the marines were perceived as relatively
useful given their capability to make arrangements allowing for paying less ‘taxes’ to
other authorities. It is likely that feelings about the marines’ relative utility that stem
from their provision of less official services find their way into discourses normalising
and legitimising naval practices that draw on registers of ‘officiality’. Hence, non-official
service provision may affect overall assessments of an authority’s relative legitimacy, in
this way also shaping perceptions of its practices of ‘taxation’. As argued by Verweijen
(2013) in relation to the eastern Congo’s Kivu provinces, the FARDC have a measure
of legitimacy there based on their engagement in both forms of security provision that
correspond to and evoke the idea of ‘the state’ and more private protection services.
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Our research demonstrates that in spite of a different security situation – notably the
absence of armed groups and less banditry – similar factors underlie the relative legitimacy
of the FARDC navy in the Bandundu area of the western Congo. One explanation for this
could be that the navy’s mandate of riverine rescue still provides a sense of ‘(public) secur-
ity provision’ read in conjunction with ‘stateness’.
The sense that the navy engages in ‘public service provision’ is strongly reinforced by
their invocation of discourses of ‘stateness’. The navy frequently references its official
mandate, enshrined in legislation such as the 2011 Defence Law, including in a ‘palliative’
sense (Olivier de Sardan 2015) (e.g. to justify ‘non-official’ practices that allegedly enable
the execution of its official mandate). Yet, as demonstrated by the fact that the 2014 inter-
ministerial decree had limited influence on what ‘taxes’ were perceived as ‘official’, refer-
ring to legislation or official mandates is not a sufficient criterion for ‘officiality’. What also
matters is whether practices evoke ‘the idea of the state’ in a more tangible way, like by
involving (physical) symbols of ‘officiality’ such as documents (that may well have no ‘offi-
cial’ status according to legislation, such as the navy’s bulletin de bureau mouvement).
Other factors that shape perceptions of ‘officiality’ are whether practices are institutiona-
lised and routinised, and are authorised and regulated by hierarchies, as is the case with
rapportage. These different factors, in turn, interact in complex ways with yet other
elements in shaping perceptions of ‘officiality’, in particular authorities’ power/importance
and overall legitimacy. As concluded by Titeca and de Herdt (2011), the symbolic power of
‘the state’ is socially constructed and negotiated, and while many different actors may
evoke the idea of ‘the state’, the effects of such invocation are shaped by power plays.
By acknowledging that ‘officiality’ is shaped by a range of criteria which often diverge
depending on the situation and authority, notions of ‘officiality’ and ‘non-officiality’ (and
relatedly, formality/informality) are better conceptualised as (contextual) processes than
as absolute qualities with a dichotomous status. In the light of this fluidity, our findings
caution against the a priori use of the labels ‘formal’ and ‘informal’, for instance the tendency
to frame all taxation not enacted in accordance to laws as ‘informal’. These a priori labels
might limit our understanding of the nature and workings of the socially constructed bound-
aries between ‘the official’ and ‘the non-official’, potentially masking the ways in which ‘the
non-official’ is not only deeply entangled in – but also reproduces and at times merges with –
‘the official’. Hence, any effort to understand logics around ‘taxation’ (including why certain
‘taxes’ persist in spite of being legally banned) must probe deeply into emic (rather than pre-
determined) notions of ‘officiality’ and ‘non-officiality’ and how they shape views of ‘taxa-
tion’ of both taxpayers and tax collectors – in different and often shifting ways.
Notes
1. Owing to security concerns, we have withheld the names of the research assistants.
2. Approximate price for buying 100–200 bags in the inland, consisting of an equal mix of fufu
and maize.
3. The following ministries: (1) Transport; (2) Interior; (3) Environment; (4) Culture and Arts;
(5) Economy and Commerce; (6) Finance; (7) Infrastructure, and (8) Defence.
4. Since the camp is too small to host all families, many rent housing from civilians around the
camp.
5. ‘assister les navires, embarcations et aéronefs en détresse dans les eaux territoriales’. See Loi
organique (2011).
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